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AMITAI  ETZIONI 
Department of  Sociology 
Columbia University 
Introduction 
The importance of  organizations as a distinct social phenomenon hardly 
needs to be demonstrated.  Most members of  modern societies are born 
in, educated by, work for, pray or.play in, and are buried by organiza- 
tions.  In social science literature, though, it is not fully accepted that 
organizations constitute a distinct analytic category.  Even less a matter 
of  consensus  is the question of which analytic categorization  is  to be 
used  in studying  this  distinct  phenomenon.  In this  paper,  we  first 
briefly indicate why we take a nonreductionist position; we then present 
one analytic categorization of  organizations which grew out of  a sec- 
ondary analysis of  a large number of  organizational studies.  We con- 
clude  by  reporting  two  new  studies,  conducted  after  this  analytic 
categorization and the related propositions  were published; the studies 
seem to lend it a measure of  support. 
A Nonreductionist, Analytic Position 
We suggest that social science data, or data about human behavior, 
are most productively  approached with the assumption  that the units 
of analysis relate to each other like a set of  Chinese nesting boxes.  That 
1 This contribution is a by-product of the author’s work under Grant No. (WA)CRD 
280-6-175 from the Department of  Health, Education, and Welfare. 
2 In this paper, the author draws on his own A  Comparative Anulysis of  Complex 
Organizations  (New  York:  The Free Press, 1961  1.  By far the best statement of  this 
approach in the psychological literature is presented by Edgar H. Schein, Organiza- 
tional Psychology  (Englewood, N. J.:  Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 44-47.  The author 
is indebted to Prof. Bernard Indik for a stimulating discussion  rior to the drafting 
of this paper and to Sarajane Heidt for comments on an earlier &aft. 
is, while there are some universal  building stones which appear in all 
the units, units differ in that emergent properties which appear in some 
do not  appear in others, and in that  some units provide contexts  for 
others -  that is, they set constraints on the variability of  attributes and 
relations in those units that are in context.  Finally, and most important, 
statements about the relations among the variables which characterize 
one unit cannot be translated into statements about other units without 
a significant, unaccounted for, residue remaining.  Nonreductionists use 
various lists of  the units.  We use roles as universal building stones and 
small groups, complex organizations,  collectivities, and societies as our 
main units. 
In defending a nonreductionist  position in favor of  a distinct sub- 
theory for the study of  complex organization, one that focuses on their 
emergent properties,  three kinds of  reductionisms are eliminated.  The 
most commonly discussed is that of  psychological  reductionism, which 
views all statements as reducible to propositions  about personality or 
an  undifferentiated “behavior.”  The second  one  recognizes  a.  social 
level in addition to a psychological  one, but sees no need for analytic 
gradations within  this level.  The third, cultural reductionism, recog- 
nizes a socio-cultural level but refuses to grant psychological attributes 
an independent analytic status.  Like the second, it usually  does not 
see a need for gradations in the social level itself. 
Our position is that both a social level as distinct from  a psycho- 
logical one and gradations within this level can be defended by one 
set of  arguments; empirically,  we suggest, the propositions  advanced 
below, which explain part of  the variance of  behavior  in organizations 
in terms of  organizational  variables, cannot be accounted for in terms 
of  nonorganizational  variables.  Pragmatically, it seems productive to 
make  these distinctions because they  lead  to new  understandings  of 
the phenomenon  under  study.  Logically,  we recognize  a  distinction 
between subunits, units, and supraunits that can be universally applied. 
We apply it here to organizations  (as the unit), small groups (as sub- 
units ), and collectivities and societies ( as supraunits )  .3 
Our approach is analytic in the sense that we join those that hold 
that social science may be advanced by promoting theories as  sets of 
variables that are systematically related, and that statements about these 
relations should be submitted systematically  to empirical validation. 
A Methodological Aside 
While there is no logical association  between the subject matter 
of  each  social science  discipline  and one  research  technique,  there 
a For additional discussion of  this point by the author, see Chapter 3 in his The Active 
Society: A Theory of  Societal  and  Political Processes (New York:  The Free Press, 
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clearly  are historical  associations.  Experiments  are more likely to be 
conducted by psychologists than by anthropologists, an historian would 
be more likely to be consulted for document analysis than a sociologist, 
and so on.  These techniques can also be ranked in terms of  their degree 
of  precision and degree of  inclusiveness.  While some techniques lend 
themselves  more  readily  to  inclusiveness  (or coverage), others  are 
more specifically precise.  While many  scholars ultimately  aim  to be 
both precise and inclusive, it must be noted that many make a choice 
to sacrifice to some degree one quality for the other.  It further seems 
that the average experimental psychologist ranks higher  on precision 
but lower on !nclusiveness than, let us  say, an average anthropologist. 
Many  a psychologist  is  willing to invest much more of  his time  and 
research budget in improving his research tools and measurements than 
many a sociologist; often, less research energy is left to invest in cover- 
age.  The following discussion is  to be viewed as the opposite kind of 
endeavor -  as an attempt to cull, by the use of  relatively primitive tools, 
some highly  inclusive  generalizations.  Those  accustomed  to  a  more 
carefully measured but also more meager diet will have to be tolerant 
with the “loose” and “sweeping” statements that follow.  This is  par- 
ticularly the case as the findings are based largely on secondary analysis 
of  numerous studies which vary much in their reliability, definitions of 
concepts, and quality of  data. 
’ 
The Basic Findings:  A Positive Association between 
Power and Involvement 
Why an Analytic Classification? 
Earlier  organization  theories  focused  largely  on  what  organiza- 
tions have in common.  Weber, for instance, specified six attributes he 
expected all organizations  to haves4 March and Simon  (1958) inven- 
toried hundreds of  propositions  in a book entitled Organizdionr, but 
never specified to which organizations these propositions apply, imply- 
ing that they apply  universally.  But  even  a  cursory  examination  of 
these theoretical statements shows that they hold for some organizations 
but not for others.  To take one example, Weber expected all organi- 
zations to be monocratic; he was using the image of  German bureau- 
cracies, specifically those of the state, the army, and the church.  But 
universities and hospitals are not monocratic; the decisions concerning 
the activities most directly related  to  their  goals -  teaching, research, 
and therapy -  are not ranked in a monocratic hierarchy. We suggest, 
hence,  that organizations  should be defined  by  one attribute -  social 
* Weber, M. Essays in sociology.  New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946, PP. 196-204, 
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units that pursue specialized goals5 -  to set organizations  apart from 
other social units, such as families, friendship groups, collectivities, and 
societies.  On all other  attributes,  organizations  are best assumed  to 
vary unless proven otherwise. 
If this  is  granted, the question becomes  one  of  whether or  not 
there is  a variable  which  can order, in an analytic fashion, the large 
variety of  organizations which exist. That is, we seek a variable that is 
part  of  a  theory  and  will  provide  for  an  exhaustive  classification. 
Secondly, we need a productive classification, one in which  organiza- 
tions that are classified as belonging in one “box” in terms of  the clas- 
sifying variable will also “bunch on  one  or more  other  dimensions. 
After having tried several variables, we found that the kind of  compli- 
ance relations that prevail in an organization provides such a variable. 
We turn now to present the basic concepts used, the resulting classifica- 
tion, and the bunching on the other variables. 
The  Centrality of Compliance 
We suggest that organizations differ systematically in the means 
they use to control their participants and in the orientations their par- 
ticipants have toward them, and that these differences provide a ground 
for  an  analytic  classification.  Organizations  are  an  “artificial”  unit 
because they are relatively more deliberately designed, structured, and 
restructured than other social units.  Families, friendship groups, collec- 
tivities,  and societies change  or  develop;  only  organizations  can  be 
reorganized.  Organizations have subunits deliberately set up in order 
to collect information systematically about the performance of  the unit 
and to revise its policies, rules, and structure on the basis of  this infor- 
mation.  Other  social units  have  no  such  subunits,  or -  like modern 
societies -have  them only to the degree that they have organizations 
(for example, state administration j. This is not to suggest that organi- 
zations have no informal, expressive, unguided  aspects.  But they are 
much more artificial than other social units. 
Because of  this  artificiality, organizations  have  to  rely  more  on 
formal controls and deliberate reward of  conforming performances  and 
punishment  of deviating  ones, in contrast to the informal  sanctioning 
which is built into the natural relationships of  the family and friendship 
groups.  In organizations, attempts are made to keep performances  in 
patterns that are highly unnatural, at least in terms of the norms of  other 
social units in which the members of  organizations  are socialized and 
6 This definition follows Talcott Parsons, “Suggestions for a Sociological Approach 
to the Theory of Organizations,’’ Administratioe Science Quarterly, Vol.  1 (1956). 
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possibly in terms of  native personality needss  Thus, for instance, for 
an organization  official  to treat all clients “universalistically” -  disre- 
garding their  color, status, family, or  friendship relations to him -  is 
not “natural” and is a behavior that, if  it is to survive, needs systemati- 
cally to be  reinforced,  and that reinforcement must  be  organized- 
hence, the centrality of  compliance for organizations. 
To analyze further these structures and establish a basis for com- 
parison, one should take into account  (a)  differences in  the kinds of 
sanctions various organizations rely upon, (b)  the orientation the par- 
ticipants have to an organization as they enter it, and  (c) the effects 
these two factors have on each other.  We turn now to explore these 
two factors and their relationship in some detail. 
Organizational Sanctioning and Power 
The capacity  to  sanction is  much  affected by  an  actor’s  power. 
Power is an actor’s ability to induce another actor to carry out his direc- 
tives or  other  norms he supports.  Many objections have been raised 
against this concept; they can only be treated here briefly.  First, it is a 
probablistic  concept, in that an actor has power  over another  if  the 
other will tend to follow his directives but not necessarily have to do so 
in each instance.  Secondly, it is not based on post hoc observations, as 
one can makeBa prediction, on the basis of  analysis of  the means avail- 
able to  two  or  more  actors  and  their  internal  characteristics  and 
mechanisms, about  how  likely  one will  be to  have  power  over  the 
other(s), before  any  power  is  actually applied.  Thirdly,  assets  and 
power are not to be confused.  Power is made out of  assets (the posses- 
sions an actor has), but, as assets may be put to other usages than the 
generation of power  (for example, they may be saved or  consumed), 
no one-to-one association between assets and power is to be assumed or 
expected.  Assets, though, are to be treated as power potentials. Finally, 
power is a sector-specific concept in that to have power in me  sector 
of  human behavior -  for instance, in economic matters -  does not auto- 
matically mean having power in others, though  there is a halo effect 
and a possibility for conversion of  power in one sector into another. 
The power we deal with here is that of  organizations, and we are 
concerned only with its application in sanctioning behavior as  far as 
conduct in the organization is  concerned.  By  stating that the power is 
of  an organizational variety, we mean that it is available to some par- 
ticipants  to control the others to conform to the  organizational  rules 
and instructions.  The use of  the same means to advance the personal 
6  If  there are such  needs is a much debated point which cannot be explored here.  It 
will be argued in our forthcoming  The Actiue Society, op. cit. 
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goals and wishes of  the power wielders triggers processes whch lead 
to its cancellation. Further, persons who leave the organization do not 
take its power with them, and new ones that join get it, if recruited in 
accord with the “proper” organizational rules. 
Power, analytically, can be exhaustively classified according to the 
means of  control applied.  If they are symbolic, such as  gestures and 
signals, we refer to the power as nomtiue. If  they are material objects, 
or cash used to obtain them, we refer to the power as remunerutiue.  If 
they are physical means which entail contact with the body  of  those 
subjected to power,  such  as  inflicting pain,  deformity, or  death,  we 
refer to coerciue power.  Threats and promises are classified according 
to the kinds of  transactions which are threatened or promised; a promise 
to pay is remunerative, a threat to slap is coercive. 
Three marginal comments are necessary.  (a)  Any concrete power 
may be either exclusively one of the three kinds or various combinations 
thereof.  (b)  Coercion is not synonymous with non-voluntary behavior. 
All behavior induced by power is involuntary, even if  it is  induced by 
the threat of  excommunication which is symbolic and, hence, normative. 
Coercive power refers here only to control by the use of  physical means, 
sometimes referred to as  means of  violence.  (c) While  some power 
can be generated through threats and promises, without actually involv- 
ing sanctions, there must be a certain frequency of  actual sanctioning 
for power to be effective; otherwise, the credibility of  threats and prom- 
ises is expected to decline. 
Our  main  finding  regarding  organization  power  is  that  most 
organizations most  of the time tend to specialize in their  reliance  on 
one  kind  of  power in the control  of  their  lower participants.  While 
organizations often mix their means of  control and draw on two or all 
three kinds, most of  them rely more heavily on one of  the three kinds. 
In turn, while there are differences in the power mix  used to control 
various subgroupings of  the participants in any one organization, there 
is  a typical pattern  for  all lower participants  in  most  organizations. 
We choose to focus on the lower participants because they constitute 
the  largest  majority  of  the participants  and  because  differences in 
control of  these, we shall see, provide a highly productive comparative 
base in terms of  corollary differences. Thus, for instances, prisons rely 
relatively more heavily on  coercion  (including confinement)  of  their 
inmates than  do  factories to  control  their  workers,  not  to  mention 
churches to control their worshipers.  Factories rely relatively heavily 
on  remunerative  power  as  compared  to  prisons  and  churches,  and 
churches  rely largely on the power of  symbols, that is, normative power. 
The reason that organizational control structures tend to specialize 
in applying one kind of  power seems to be that the various kinds are IW  PEOPLE, GROUPS,  AND  ORGANIZATIONS 
contradictory; when applied jointly, they neutralize each other. A study 
which compared the application  of  normative power by itself  to one 
where it was given similar status to utilitarian power showed the purer 
application to be more effective (Merton, 1946).  Organizations which 
give two kinds of power a similar status tend to segregate their applica- 
tion internally, or are not effective (Etzioni, 1961  ). 
These  statements  are  not  without  methodological  difficulties. 
Instances of  use of  various kinds of  power  are not easy to count and 
are difficult to weigh.  Only very few of  the numerous studies of  the 
various organizations we analysed have direct, validated, and quanti- 
tative measures of the power mix used. We, hence, had to make do with 
various approximations.  Here is an example of  a relutioely good indi- 
cator, taken from  a study  of  a factory and  used  to show the highly 
remunerative control used. 
TABLE  1.  “Method of  Recognition” Preferred by Workers 
and Supervisorso 
Method of  Recognition  Rank Order 
Workers  Su  ervisors 
1  1  Recommend pay increase 
Train employees for better jobs  2  6 
Like  FinSEffective 
Recommend promotions  3  3 
Give more responsibility  4  4 
Praise’  sincerely and thoroughly  5  5 
Tell superiors  7  7 
Give pat on the back  9  2 
Make notes of  it in ratings and reports  10  10 
6  9 
8  8 
Give more interesting work 
Give privileges 
Source:  F.  Mann and J. Dent, Appraisals of  Supewisors  (Ann Arbor:  Survey 
Research Center, University of  Michigan, 1954), p. 25. 
We would have preferred the question to have been phrased differ- 
ently; “methods of  recognition” has human relations and psychological 
connotations and may well evoke normative notions in the supervisors’ 
minds  (and may  explain, in part,  why  the workers  see the methods 
used as more “remunerative” than the supervisors  ) .’  We would like to 
know more  about  the  frequency  distributions, because  the  intervals 
between the rungs are, in all likelihood, uneven and there may be sub- 
groups of supervisors or workers that are highly atypical which would 
affect the interpretation of  the scale. We would also like to have directly 
comparable data for other organizations.  All these data are not avail- 
7 The su  ervisors ranked  remunerative methods first but normative ones as second 
and thir$  while the workers’ first three are remunerative.  F.  Mann and J. Dent, 
Appraisals of Supewisors (Ann  Arbor:  Survey Research Center, University of  Michi- 
gan, 1954). 
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able.  Hence, our secondary analysis, which draws on this  and other 
such studies, is, as we said earlier, necessarily one of  first approximations. 
To the degree that such data and analysis can be relied upon, we 
conclude,  on  the  basis  of  such  studies,  the  following  ranking  of 
organizations: 
TABLE  2.  A Compliance Classification’ 
Organizations in each category are listed according to the relative 
weight  of  the  predominant  compliance pattern  in  their  compliance 
structure.  Those giving the predominant  pattern  greatest weight  are 
listed first. 
1.  Predominantly coercive 
Concentration camps 
Prisons  (most) 
Conectional “institutions” (large majority ) 
Custodial mental hospitals 
Prisoner of  war camps 
Relocation centers 
Coercive unions 
Place in category undetermined:  Forced-labor camps 
Blue-collar industries and blue-collar divisions in other industries 
White-collar industries and white-collar divisions in other industries (norma- 
Business unions (normative compliance is a secondary pattern) 
Farmers’ organizations (normative compliance is a secondary pattern) 
Peacetime military organizations (coercive compliance is a secondary pattern) 
Religious organizations (including churches, orders, monasteries, convents) 
Ideological political organizations 
General hos  itals 
Colle es ani  universities 
sociafunions 
Voluntary associations 
2.  Predominantly utilitarian (remunerative) 
tive compliance is a secondary pattern ) 
3.  Predominantly normative 
a.  Fraternal associations (high social compliance) 
b.  Fund-raising and action associations (high social plus secondary empha- 
sis on pure normative compliance) 
Schools (coercion in varyin  degrees is the secondary pattern) 
Therapeutic mental hospitafs  (coercion is the secondary pattern) 
Professional organizations (including research organizations, law firms, news- 
papers, planning firms,  etc.; utilitarian compliance is the secondary pattern) 
Place in category undetermined:  “Core” organizations of  social movements. 
4.  Dual structures 
Normative-coercive: Combat units 
Utilitarian-normative:  Majorit  of  unions 
Utilitarian-coercive:  ships  Some earfy industries, some farms, company towns, and 
* Source: Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysi~  of  Complex Organizations (New 
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Dual organizations refer to those whose power is  an exception to 
the rule; no one kind of  power prevails, but two  seem to be given about 
equal status  (we found no organizations where all three  had  equal 
status ). 
One other complication must be introduced.  It is not self-evident 
.  who the lower participants of  an organization  are.  There is some dis- 
agreement if, for instance, the students are “in” a university,  as partici- 
pants, or “out,” as clients.  Indeed, it has even been suggested that the 
customers of a firm are to be considered part of  the organization  (March 
and Simon, 1958, p. 89). For reasons we discussed elsewhere in detail 
(Etzioni, 1961,  pp. 16-27), we assessed  participation  on three main 
dimensions:’  involvement,  subordination,  and  performance  require- 
ments.  We use a simple scoring of  low, medium, and high and include 
as participants all those who score medium or high on at least one of 
these dimensions.  Customers of  a supermarket score low on all three 
and, hence, are not participants by this definition.  Students score me- 
dium to high  on at least two  and, therefore,  are “in.”  Members  of 
voluntary associations may be in or out, depending on the sociological 
reality of  their participation,  as assessed on these dimensions.  If  they 
are formally  members, but do little with or for the association, have 
little involvement in its affairs, and largely  disregard its “orders,” they 
are not participants by our account. 
Participants’ Involvement in Organization 
Our second main finding is that most of  the lower participants of 
most organizations have an involvement in their Organization which is 
“typicaP to their kind  of  organization.  For instance, most  inmates of 
most prisons are more hostile toward their prisons than are most workers 
toward most factories. We define involvement as a cathectic-evaluative 
orientation of  an actor, which is characterized in terms of  intensity and 
direction.  The intensity ranges from high to low; the direction is either 
positive or negative.  The distribution of  involvement of  all participants 
of  all organizations seems to have a curvilinear  shape.  At the one end 
are the intensely negatively involved, while  at the other end are the 
positively intensive; in the middle are those which are either positively 
or negatively involved but with less intensity. 
Data about the involvement of lower participants in organizations 
are much more available than data on power applied to them and are 
easier to quantify, as no three-way mixes  are involved.  There is  one 
hitch,  though;  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  lower  participants,  each 
organization has several facets, and their involvement  in them varies. 
The orientation toward organizational goals, for instance,  is often dif- 
ferent from that toward the supervisors, and the latter is different from 
the orientation to the organizational control mix. 
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There are two  ways to proceed from here: either to compare the 
involvement  of  the participants of  various  organizations as regarding 
the same facet (for example, inmates’, workers’, and students’ involve- 
ments in the goals of  their respective organizations), or to build indices 
of  involvement for each organization encompassing the basic facets and 
compare the index scores. In a previous report, we attempted some of 
each (Etzioni, 1961, pp. 16-22), but much of  the comparison remains 
to be done.  As far as our  secondary analysis  allows us  to tell, using 
either one of  these procedures,  organizations can be ranked, according 
to the modal involvements of  the lower participants, as being relatively 
more or  less intensively  involved  and the modal  involvement  being 
positive or negative. 
Power and Involvement 
Our third finding is that there is an association between the kind 
of power mix typically used by an organization and the modal involve- 
ment of  its lower participants.  Highly coercive mixes tend to be met 
with  intensive  negative  involvement,  normative  mixes  with  intense 
positive involvement, and remunerative mixes with less intense positive 
or negative  involvement,  depending on  the mix.  This statement, we 
claim, holds  not  just for the “crude” associations  of  the three  basic 
mixes, but  also for  “finer” ones.  Thus,  in  the  contemporary  United 
States, the control mix  of  white collar workers  seems, on the average, 
somewhat  less remunerative and somewhat more normative than the 
mix of unskilled  blue-collar  workers,  though both are predominantly 
remunerative. In line with our basic proposition, there is some evidence 
that unskilled blue-collar workers are somewhat more negative (or less 
positive)  in  their  modal  involvement.  Or,  most  colleges  are  more 
“purely” normative in their controls than most high schools, and -we 
suggest -  modal student involvement is more intensely positive in col- 
leges, though it is positive in both and the power mix is predominantly 
normative in both the average college and high school.  Similarly, cor- 
rectional  institutions are somewhat less coercive than prisons,  and in- 
mate negative involvement seems somewhat less intense. 
Next, the basic statement seems to hold  (though with  some lag, 
which must be expected for obvious reasons)  for changes over time. 
That is,  when  an organization  changes its  power  mix,  let us  say  a 
“custodial” (that is, highly coercive) prison becomes  relatively “thera- 
peutic”  (that is,  more  normative),  we  expect  (and there  are  some 
reports of changes in inmates ’orientations toward) less intensely nega- 
tive involvements. 
The power-involvement  association  seems to have one main  excep- 
tion:  when coercion is very high, negative involvement does not rise 
but reverses itself.  There is some evidence that men in concentration 104  PEOPLE,  GROUPS, AND  ORGANIZATIONS 
camps did not focus their hostility on the Organization but on each other 
(Bettelheim, 1943). 
When we seek to refer to the power mix  and involvement mode 
jointly, we refer to the compliance structure of  an organization.  Struc- 
tures, which, in line with the prevailing associations, have power mixes 
and involvement modes which complement each other, may be referred 
to as “congruent structures.” “Noncongruent” compliance structures - 
having, for example, normative control and negative involvement -  are 
to be expected and are found, because the kind of  power mix an organi- 
zation uses is affected  by factors other than the kind of  involvement the 
participants  exhibit,  and the kind  of  involvement the participants  ex- 
hibit is affected by factors other than the power mix  the organization 
applies,  For instance, for an organization to employ coercion, it needs 
a societal license which may be extended, limited, or revoked.  To rely 
heavily  on remunerative  power,  an  organization  requires  a  suitable 
income, which is  not always available.  The participants’ involvement 
is affected by their previous socialization experience with other organi- 
zations and with the one under study. 
When the power  employed  and  the  involvement  exhibited  are 
noncongruent, we expect a high level of  intraorganizational strain and 
pressure for one of the “sides” to adjust.  When environmental factors 
unlock, the compliance structures are expected to move toward one of 
the congruent types.  Thus, if  intensely hostile inmates are treated by 
a new prison staff  (social workers, psychiatrists) with normative means, 
either they will change their orientation to a more positive one -  or the 
staff  will tend to turn toward more coercive controls, within limits of 
the environmental tolerance. 
We view the kind of  power mix an organization typically employs 
and the modal involvement of  its lower participants as  two variables 
which affect each other, but not one as the cause and the other as an 
effect.  An  organization may be under pressure to rely on a relatively 
coercive mix because of  the intense hostility of  the lower participants; 
or friendly lower participants may be antagonized because a coercive 
mix  is  employed.  While  the  two factors  affect  each  other,  each  is 
affected by other factors, and hence, they vary independently and no 
one-to-one relationship is  expected.  For instance, in the study quoted 
earlier, the workers’ attitudes were less positive than would be expected 
on the basis of  the supervisors’ controls  (at least  if  one accepts their 
reporting of  their methods of  control as accurate). 
The Correlates of  Compliance 
The fourth finding seems to US to be by far the most important one, 
to justify many of  the preceding  definitional exercises and  methodo- 
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logical concessions, and to contain a set of  many specific findings: we 
suggest that organizations which differ in their power mix  and  in the 
modal inuolvement of  their lower participants will also differ on a score 
of other dimensions, which amounts to saying that these two dimensions 
make for wholly different  social units, (If this statement is valid, it also 
lends support to our earlier claim for the fruitfulness  of  the classifica- 
tion used). We characterize these first in Gestalt terms.  In order not to 
complicate the discussion unnecessarily, we focus on three archetypes - 
prisons, factories, and churches -  leaving out finer gradations of  power 
mixes and involvement modes, and limiting ourselves here to congruent 
types. 
Organizations where coercion is relatively heavily relied upon and 
the modal involvement is intensely  negative -  traditional  prisons, for 
instance -  tend rigidly to be divided into two castes, with little expres- 
sive contact between them and considerable inter-caste tension and open 
conflict. Mobility from one caste to the other, in effect, does not exist. 
While one caste controls the other, like an occupation army, it does not, 
as a rule, provide leadership for the other.  The two castes do not make 
a social whole, though they function within the limits of  one organiza- 
tion.  Their values are at least in part antithetical.  Various “ameliora- 
tions” are found -  for  example, there are  often  some “collaborators” 
with the guards among the inmates, and there often is some “corruption 
of  authority” on the side of  some guards who  are less coercive than 
most of  the others.  But, by  and  large,  the  archetype  of  two hostile 
camps, one subjugating the other, holds for most relations. 
Organizations where normative power is relatively  heavily relied 
upon and the modal involvement is intensely positive -  in an effective 
church, for instance-will  tend  to be well  integrated  into one  com- 
munity, with many expressive contacts across the ranks, comparatively 
little inter-rank  tension,  and  mainly  latent  conflict.  Mobility up  the 
ranks is  comparatively common.  There is  a relatively high degree of 
value consensus among the lower and higher participants.  Much lead- 
ership “flows” down the organizational structure.  There are some con- 
trary  factors, such  as conflicts among leaders  (for instance,  lay  and 
religious ones )  and conflicts among strict versus moderate normative 
interpretations.  But, by and large, the archetype  of  one community 
functioning in one organization prevails in most relations. 
Organizations that rely heavily on remunerative power are “in the 
middle.”  The participants in such organizations are often divided into 
three or more “classes,” differing in socioeconomic background, educa- 
tion, and consumption habits,  Workers, supervisors, and management 
are the main ones (Dalton, 1947). While most of  the mobility is within 
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among the classes vary considerably from factory to factory, but, on the 
average, there is less of  an expressive split than in coercive organizations 
and much more instrumental cooperation, but much less of  an expres- 
sive community than in churches, though both kinds of  organizations 
. rank about the same on instrumental matters (a  kind of  activity which 
is  marginal for churches but central for factories).  Workers  tend  to 
have  leaders  of  their  own but  also  to  accept  some  leadership  from 
supervisors. 
Now, these basic differences in the general character of  organiza- 
tions which differ in their  compliance structures can be “dimension- 
alized along a large variety of  specific dimensions, such as degree of 
consensus across the ranks, amount of  cross-rank communication and 
frequency of  communication blocks, status of  lower participants’ lead- 
ers, and so forth.  We found  that in some instances the relationship 
between the nature of  the compliance structure and such a dimension 
is  linear; that is,  there  is  a straight positive association between  the 
dimension, let us say the level of  cross-rank consensus, and place on the 
power mix and involvement continuum. In other cases, the relationship 
is curvilinear, with the dimension -  for instance, organizational scope 
(the degree  to  which  the  organization  penetrates  into  various  life 
spheres of  the participants) -higher  at the two ends of  the compliance 
continuum than in the middle.  For all variables studied, though, one 
association or another with the basic classifying variables -  power mix 
and involvement mode -  was found ( Etzioni, 1961  ). 
Some Validation in Primary Research 
Since the basic classification and some of  its correlates were pub- 
lished in 1961, a number of  studies were made testing the basic classi- 
fication and its basic correlates or adding to the correlates (Jones, 1965; 
Leeds, 1964; Levinson and Schiller, 1966). In one study, relying on a 
statistical analysis of  a large number organizations, no assciation was 
found  between  our  compliance  classification and  the organizational 
goals (Haas, Hall & Johnson, 1966). The same study attempts to cor- 
relate organization goals with another organization classification, that 
by Blau and Scott (1962), which classifies organizations according to 
their  main  clientele, but also found no  association.  While there  are 
some questions about the quality of  the data used in this study, the 
negative finding weakens our proposition.  On the other hand, all the 
other studies support or  extend it.  The most important of  these is  a 
study of  the power used by  the Chinese Communist party to control 
the peasantry and the orientation of  the peasantry to this party and the 
means of  control it employs  (Skinner, 1965).  The importance of  the 
study is that it is dynamic:  it shows in detail how, as the party changed 
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its  control again and again, the peasants’ involvement changed  very 
much in the way the preceding analysis would lead one to expect. 
Zelda Gamson  (1966) compared the faculty of  two departments 
of  a state college.  She found that faculty members of  one department 
who are less normative in their ways of  handling students than  those 
of  another, on one dimension, are also different -  in the same direction 
-  on several others. 
TABLE 3.  Mean Percentage of  Faculty Time Spent on Teaching Duties, 
Curriculum Planning, and Counseling Students,’ 
Spring, 1961-Spring,  1963* ’ 
Spring  Fall  Spring  Fall  Spring 
1961  1961  1962  1962  1963 
NS  SS  NS  SS  NS  SS  NS  SS  NS  SS  ----- 
Teaching duties”’  (Classes, 
Curriculum plannin  68  99  64116  98 
Counseling ( Indivikal 
studentsororganizations)  3  12  7  14  5  11  7  9  8  5 
N  9 12  10  13  10  14  12  11  11  10 
grading, preparation)  83% 68%  74%  60%  79% 68%  65% 65%  71% 72% 
’  Does not include research. 
’*  Source:  Zelda Camson, “Utilitarian and Normative Orientations Toward EducA- 
tion,” Sociology of Education, Vol. 39,  No. 1 (Winter 1966),  p. 66. 
”*  P of differences between NS and SS in  spring, 1961 and fall, 1961 <.OS  After 
1961,  differences are not statistically  significant. 
NS stands for the less normative Natural Science department, and 
SS for the more normative Social Science department.  The faculties of 
the two departments also differed in their conceptions and expectations 
of  students,  educational  objectives, norms  regarding  student-faculty 
relations, and conceptions of  their effects on the students.  No data on 
student involvement are reported. 
Joseph Julian studied the compliance structures of  five hospitals - 
a university hospital, a medium-size general voluntary hospital, a large 
general voluntary hospital, a tuberculosis sanatorium, and a veterans’ 
hospital -  all located within the metropolitan area of  a large western 
city. The hospitals were ranked according to the degree to which their 
control mixes were “purely” normative or included a coercive element. 
The involvement of  183 patients was  studied and found to be in line 
with  the basic proposition -  that  is,  more  positive  in  the normative 
hospitals than in the normative-coercive ones.  Then, the type of  hos- 
pital  was  associated  with  the  amount  of  inter-rank  communication 
blocks, with the following finding. 108  PEOPLE, GROUPS,  AND ORGANIZATIONS 
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. . .  more reported communication blocks  occurred in the normative-coercive 
hospitals than in the normative hospitals.  Blockage occurred with regard to 
contact  involving primarily  instrumental  activity  in  both  an  upward  and 
downward direction.  Furthermore, it was shown that the amount of  control 
as well as the type of  control is related to the nature and degree of  communi- 
cation blocks.  (Julian, 1966, p. 389) 
There is nothing conclusive about the data available either from 
the secondary or primary analysis.  It seems safe to conclude, however, 
that a basic analytic classification of  organizations seems to appear in 
varying ways in a large variety of  data.  Additional research will have 
to ascertain more precisely what it looks like, what its dimensions are, 
and probably revise our conception of  it.  It seems, though, quite cer- 
tain that there is “something out there” and that we have some notions 
of  its basic contours.  Secondly, these organizational variables illustrate 
what is meant by emergent properties, of  which organizational charac- 
teristics are a sub-set. While it may still be argued that such statements 
about organizational variables “really” reflect states of  personality, the 
burden of  proof  is  on those who can provide evidence to this  effect. 
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